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Nicaragua v. United States: The Power of
the International Court of Justice to
Indicate Interim Measures in Political
Disputes
I. Background
In 1979 the revolutionary Government of National Reconstruc-
tion overthrew the freely elected administration of President General
Anastasio Somoza Debayle to assume power as the new government
of the Republic of Nicaragua. The "Sandinistas," as the new regime
is known,' represent a coalition of the National Liberation Front and
other leftist guerilla groups which together were responsible for oust-
ing the former Somoza regime. This change in the control of the
Nicaraguan government has caused tremendous concern among
United States foreign policy makers.' The suspicion of strong Soviet
involvement in the new Sandinista government is perceived as a
threat to the close diplomatic and economic ties the United States
has traditionally had with Central American countries.3
To counter this perceived Soviet influence, the United States,
under the Carter Administration, tendered economic assistance to
Nicaragua in the hope that American aid could help transform the
Nicaraguan revolution into a free democratic society and thereby
prevent the country from adopting a Communist system." Despite
the efforts made during the Carter Administration, relations between
the United States and Nicaragua have become increasingly antago-
nistic during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan. Possessing inculpa-
I. The Sandinistas, originally a leftist guerilla organization dedicated to the overthrow
of the feudalistic Somoza dynasty, takes its name from popular hero Augusto C6sar Sandino, a
guerilla leader assassinated on the order of Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1934. Somoza Garcia
was the predecessor and father of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the U.S. supported dictator who
resigned his presidency in July 1979 after weeks of attempting to repel Sandinista armed
attacks.
2. A detailed discussion of these facts can be found in U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua,
CONG. DIG., Nov. 1984, at 259 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua].
3. See generally L.P. LANGLEY, CENTRAL AMERICA: THE REAL STAKES 3-16 (1985);
TROUBLE IN OUR BACKYARD (M. Diskin ed. 1983); D.G. MUNRO, THE FIVE REPUBLICS OF
CENTRAL AMERICA: THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR RELATIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES (1918) for detailed information concerning United States presence
and interest in Central America.
4. During the years 1976-80, the Carter Administration adopted a policy of "friendly
cooperation" toward Nicaragua which included the "provision of effective and timely assis-
tance." U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 261.
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tory evidence of Nicaraguan aid to leftist guerillas in El Salvador,
President Reagan has insisted that the government of Nicaragua dis-
continue the stream of arms to Salvadoran resistance fighters.5 In
addition, the United States has provided covert assistance to anti-
Sandinista guerillas since 1981.
Despite these facts, the Reagan Administration has publicly an-
nounced support 6 for the Contadora regional negotiation efforts. 7 In
1984 Secretary of State George Schultz announced United States
interest in reaching an agreement with Nicaragua to reduce Nicara-
guan military forces, end Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran gueril-
las, remove Cuban and Soviet military advisors and reaffirm the Nic-
araguan government's commitment to human rights.8
In juxtaposition with these moves toward a negotiated settle-
ment between the differing United States and Nicaraguan ideologies,
national press releases in early 1984 indicated that the United States
had been involved in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors.9 Several
ships were hit in February and March and although anti-Sandinista
Nicaraguan guerillas had carried out the actual maneuvers, they re-
portedly were supervised by Central Intelligence agency (CIA) per-
sonnel.10 It was these mining activities that were the primary focus
of several charges alleged against the United States in Nicaragua's
recent lawsuit before the United nations International Court of Jus-
tice, Nicaragua v. United States."
On May 10, 1984 the International Court of Justice12 (ICJ), in
response to these charges, granted the request of the Republic of
Nicaragua that the Court indicate interim measures of protection
5. Id. See also End of a "Secret War"?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 23, 1984,
at 22.
6. The Diplomatic Alternative, TIME, May 28, 1984, at 61. See also generally U.S.
Effort to Achieve Peace in Central America, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1984, at 67 [hereinafter
cited as U.S. Effort].
7. At a conference in October 1982 in San Jose, Costa Rica, a final act was adopted
that formulated proposals for dealing on a comprehensive basis with the problems of instability
in the Central American region. In January 1983, representatives of Mexico, Panama, Colom-
bia and Venezuela met on the island of Contadora in Panama. In May 1983 these states,
known as the "'Contadora Group," succeeded in bringing together for negotiation five troubled
Central American States including Nicaragua. See generally 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 836-63
(1984). See also infra text accompanying note 47; U.S. Effort, supra note 6, at 68-70.
8. U.S. Effort, supra note 6, at 68, 71.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 3; Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1984, at I,
col. 3.
10. N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
II. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 i.C.J. 169 (Interim Protection Order of May 10), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 468
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Nicaragua v. United States].
12. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principle judicial organ of the
United Nations. It succeeded the League of Nation's Permanent Court of International Justice
in 1945, and, like the earlier court, is often referred to as the World Court. (For purposes of
this comment, the term "World Court" is used to refer to that body of jurisprudence which is
shared by both courts.) The U.N. Charter deals with the ICJ in Article 7, paragraph 1; Arti-
cle 36, paragraph 3 and Articles 92-96.
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enjoining the United States from continuing military and paramili-
tary activities in the Central American region.13 The Court's indica-
tion of provisional measures in the Nicaragua v. United States case"
raises several controversial issues including: 1) the extent of the
Court's power to grant a party's request for indication when substan-
tive jurisdiction'6 is questioned or contested, and 2) whether the
Court can or should"6 take cognizance of disputes that are essentially
political in character.
This comment will examine international case history on the
question of the Court's power to indicate interim measures of protec-
tion when substantive jurisdiction is contested by a party to the pro-
ceedings. The discussion will also address what role, if any, the polit-
ical realities of international legal disputes should play in the Court's
decision to adjudicate matters brought before it.
II. International Law and the Indication of Interim Measures of
Protection
A. Introduction
The institution of interim measures of protection is much like
the common law technique of preliminary injunctive relief. It is a
judicial device utilized by the International Court of Justice to en-
join an "interested" party from engaging in certain types of behav-
ior. 1 7 "Interested" parties include all who have a stake in the out-
come of the proceedings before the Court.' 8 Because hostile parties
may be considered "interested," a controversy will naturally arise
when interim measures of protection are imposed against parties that
have been haled into Court under protest.
When the Court indicates provisional measures, its goal is to
13. "Interim measures of protection" and "provisional measures" are usually used in-
terchangeably and refer to suggestions made by the International Court of Justice for the
purpose of preserving the rights of a party pending the outcome of legal proceedings. See
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 41 (published in I.C.J. Acts and
Documents No. 4 at 60-89) [hereinafter cited as STATUTE OF THE COURT].
The exact meaning of the term "to indicate" has been a source of some controversy but it
is usually regarded as being synonymous with "to suggest" rather than "to order" or "to pre-
scribe." See Crockett, The Effects of Interim Measures of Protection in the International
Court of Justice, 7 CAL. U. INT'L L.J. 348, at 353 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Crockett].
14. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11.
15. Substantive jurisdiction denotes jurisdiction over the merits of a case. For a discus-
sion on how this differs from the Court's jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures, see infra
note 24.
16. A court can take cognizance of a dispute if it has the jurisdiction to do so. How-
ever, a court should take cognizance of a dispute only when the issues involved are justiciable.
For a discussion on how United States federal courts have dealt with this issue in the context
of political questions and American foreign affairs see H STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 132-40 (2d ed. 1976).
17. STATUTE OF THE COURT, supra note 13, at art. 41, para. 1.
18. A state that has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision-
in the case may be allowed to intervene. See id. at art. 62, para. 1.
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preserve the respective rights of either party pending outcome of the
proceedings. 9 The Court's power to indicate interim measures ema-
nates from Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice,20 which states:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought
to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measure suggested
shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security
Council.2
According to the Rules of the International Court of Justice,22 a
party may request at anytime during the proceedings that the Court
indicate provisional measures.23
If the request for interim measures follows a determination by
the court that it has jurisdiction over the substantive issues of the
case, the dilemma of incidental jurisdiction24 will not arise. The con-
troversies stemming from questionable jurisdiction only present
themselves when an applicant's request for interim measures is made
prior to the Court's ruling on its own jurisdiction over the merits. 5 If
the Court delays the indication of provisional measures and later
rules that it has substantive jurisdiction, the applicant's rights may
be irreparably harmed in the interim. On the other hand, if the
Court exercises its authority to indicate provisional measures, only to
subsequently rule that it is without substantive jurisdiction, irrepara-
19. See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1979 I.C.J. 7, 16-17 (Interim Protection Order of Dec. 15) (United States requested, among
other things, that the Court indicate to Iran that it release all American hostages, return the
Embassy, Chancery and Consulate to United States control, and refrain from instituting any
proceeding against an American citizen in its own courts) [hereinafter cited as U.S. v. Iran
(Interim Protection)].
20. STATUTE OF THE COURT, supra note 13. See also id. at art. 30; U.N. CHARTER at
Chapter XIV.
21. Id. at art. 41.
22. RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE [hereinafter cited as RULES OF
COURT]. The Rules are based on the latest text of the Rules of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (that of March 11, 1936) and are published in I.C.J. Acts and Documents No.
4 at 92-161. See also STATUTE OF THE COURT, supra note 13, at art. 30; 1977-1978 I.C.J.Y.B.
111-19 (1978).
23. Rule 66(l) of the Rules of Court states: "A request for the indication of interim
measures may be filed at anytime during the proceedings in the case in connection with which
it is made." Id. at art. 61, para. 1.
24. The power of the Court to indicate provisional measures does not come from the
same source as its power to determine the merits. The power to adjudicate on the merits
(substantive jurisdiction) is founded on the consent of the parties, whereas the power to indi-
cate interim measures of protection is part of the Court's incidental jurisdiction which is de-
rived from Article 41 of the Statute of the Court. Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection
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ble harm may be done to the rights of the respondent.26
Once the Court has made a final positive decision on its sub-
stantive jurisdiction, incidental jurisdiction is assumed. 7 Neverthe-
less, the power of the Court to investigate the activities of a state
depends upon an instrument conferring jurisdiction to do so. 28 Due
to-the fact that only forty-four members of the United Nations and
three non-members have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court,2 9 lit-
igation on the issue of jurisdiction has not been uncommon.3
Much of the dispute surrounding the indication of interim mea-
sures of protection has concerned the question of to what degree of
certainty the Court should ascertain its own substantive jurisdic-
tion 31 before exercising its powers under Article 41.32 The World
Court cases that have dealt with this issue have not always provided
clear cut guidelines by which to evaluate the needs for a nexus be-
tween these two concepts.33 The very recent case of Nicaragua v.
United States34 provides a superior background against which to
base an in-depth analysis of the Court's treatment of this issue. Fur-
thermore, due to the political circumstances surrounding the factual
allegations of the dispute, the case also easily lends itself to a discus-
sion of whether political, economic, or other "real world" considera-
tions play a role in the Court's deliberations.
B. Nicaragua v. United States - Procedural Development
On April 9, 1984 the Republic of Nicaragua filed an Applica-
tion with the International Court of Justice to institute legal pro-
ceedings against the United States of America. According to the
pleadings, Nicaragua sought damages allegedly caused by United
States covert military activities in the Central American region as
26. Id.
27. Id. at 262.
28. Merrills, Interim Measures of Protection and the Substantive Jurisdiction of the
International Court, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 86, 90 (1977). See infra notes 36-37.
29. 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 57-91 (1984).
30. This issue was litigated before the Permanent Court of International Justice on six
occasions and before the International Court of Justice on ten. See infra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text.
31. The degrees of probability of the Court's possession of substantive jurisdiction
range from the proposition that jurisdiction is absolutely certain to the proposition that there is
definitely no jurisdiction. Of course, neither of these propositions occurs until the Court has
finally ruled on the question. At the stage interim measures are requested the Court is faced
with the infinite range of possibilities between the two extremes. Mendelson, supra note 24, at
262-63.
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 57-110 and accompanying text.
34. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11. The International Court heard Nicara-
gua's oral argument on the merits of the case in mid-September 1985. The government of the
United States boycotted the proceeding; nevertheless, the Court was expected to deliver its
opinion before the end of 1985. R. Lacayo, U.S. Policy Goes on Trial, TIME, Sept. 30, 1985, at
85 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Policy Goes on Trial].
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well as permanent injunctive relief.3 5
In requesting adjudication of the dispute, Nicaragua invoked
Declarations of Acceptance to the jurisdiction of the Court which
both the United States and Nicaragua had deposited with the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations" as per Article 36 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice.3 7 As factual basis for its suit,
Nicaragua claimed to have suffered grievous injury as a direct result
of illegal military activities that had been carried out since 1981
under American direction and supervision."
In order to invoke subject matter jurisdiction of the Court,3 9
Nicaragua alleged United States violations of: customary interna-
tional law,' 0 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,"' Articles
18 and-20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States,'2
and various other treaties and agreements between the parties.' 3 At
the same time that Nicaragua filed its application to initiate pro-
35. Specifically, Nicaragua asked that the United States cease from all use of force
against Nicaragua, that the United States be enjoined from supporting military and paramili-
tary activities in and against Nicaragua and that all efforts to restrict or endanger access to or
from Nicaraguan ports be prohibited. Nicaragua also sought reparation for damages to per-
sons, property and the Nicaraguan economy caused by the alleged United States violations of
international law. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11, at 469.
36. United States Declaration of Acceptance to the Jurisdiction of The International
Court, Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. 1598 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Declaration of
Acceptance]; Nicaraguan Declaration of Acceptance to the Jurisdiction of The International
Court, Sept. 24, 1929, 88 L.N.T.S. 272.
37. Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court states:
The states parties to the present Statute may at anytime declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipsofacto, and without special agreement, in relation to
any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all
legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of
an international obligation.
STATUTE OF THE COURT, supra note 13, at art. 36, para. 2.
38. More specifically, Nicaragua claimed that the United States was "using military
force against Nicaragua and intervening in Nicaragua's internal affairs, in violation of Nicara-
gua's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and of the most fundamental
and universally-accepted principles of international law." Nicaragua v. United States, supra
note 1I, at 468.
39. See supra note 37.
40. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11, at 469.
41. Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter states,
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
nations.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
42. Article 18 of the Charter of the Organization of American States prohibits the use
of force except in cases of self-defense. Article 20 imposes upon states a duty to settle their
disputes pacifically. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 59 Stat.
1031, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 789 U.N.T.S. 287.
43. See Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11, at 468-69.
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ceedings, it also requested the indication of interim measures of
protection.
Immediately upon filing of the Nicaraguan Application with the
ICJ, question as to the jurisdiction of the International Court arose.
As of April 6, 1984, a mere three days before Nicaragua's Applica-
tion was filed, the United States had already deposited a controver-
sial declaration with the Secretary General of the United Nations44
purporting to modify the conditions under which the United States
would accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court.45 In the declaration the United States asserted that it would
no longer accept the jurisdiction of the Court regarding "disputes
with any Central American State or arising out of or related to
events in Central America, any of which disputes shall be settled in
such manner as the parties to them agree." 6 The United States
claimed its purpose in submitting the modification was "to foster the
continuing regional dispute settlement process which seeks a negoti-
ated solution to the interrelated political, economic and security
problems of Central American.'
7
Although the original United States acceptance of World Court
jurisdiction provided for a six-month notice period prior to termina-
tion,4" the United States justified its non-compliance with this notice
period on several grounds which it claimed were unique to this case.
First, the United States invoked the international law principle of
"reprocity," i.e., because the Nicaraguan Declaration of Acceptance
is immediately terminable, the United States is also entitled to intro-
duce a temporal qualification into its declaration with immediate
effect. 9
As a second argument against the Court's jurisdiction, the
United States asserted that the Republic of Nicaragua never offi-
cially acceded to the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court.
The United States noted that Nicaragua never deposited an instru-
ment of ratification of acceptance with the Secretary of League of
44. Letter to U.N. Secretary-General Concerning Non-Applicability of Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with Regard to Disputes with Central Ameri-
can States (April 6, 1984), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 670 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
U.S. Letter of April 6, 1984].
45. See U.S. Declaration of Acceptance, supra note 36.
46. U.S. Letter of April 6, 1984, supra note 44.
47. Id. The Letter was referring to the Contadora Process. See supra note 7. See also
infra note 137 and accompanying text.
48. See U.S. Declaration of Acceptance, supra note 36.
49. Article 36(3) of the Statute of the Court provides that states' declarations of ac-
ceptance may be made on condition of reciprocity on the part of other states. STATUTE OF THE
COURT, supra note 13, at art. 36, para. 3. The U.S. Declaration of Acceptance, supra note 36,
states, "the United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipsofacto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice." Id. (emphasis added).
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Nations.50 The United States Agent therefore argued that,
[T]he declaration which Nicaragua made on 24 September
1929 . . .never entered into force. As a result, Nicaragua never
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court.
Consequently, Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute of Inter-
national Court of Justice [which renders declarations made
under Article 36 of the statute of the Permanent Court accept-
ances of the Compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ] is inapplicable,
and cannot serve as the basis of jurisdiction over the Application
and the claims contained therein or over the Request.5'
In addition to its arguments against jurisdiction of the Court,
the United States also contended that the Court should deny the re-
quest for the indication of provisional measures for a number of
"compelling reasons." The United States argued that the rights and
interests of other Central American States would be directly affected
by an indication and, in the absence of these indispensable parties,
the Court could not properly proceed.52
Furthermore, the United States informed the Court that the
Central American States, other States in the region, the Organiza-
tion of American States and the United Nations had initiated a re-
gion-wide negotiation process known as the Contadora Process which
could be adversely affected by formal legal proceedings between par-
ticipating States. 53 On this basis, the United States claimed that the
indication of provisional measures would be particularly inappropri-
ate: "In the present situation in Central America, the indication of
such measures could irreparably prejudice the interests of a number
of States and seriously interfere with the negotiations being con-
ducted pursuant to the Contadora Process."54
Although the Court did not conclusively decide the question of
substantive jurisdiction in its Order of Interim Protection, it did rule
that the Nicaraguan Declaration of 24 September 1929 (whether
50. Article 36(5) of the Statute of the Court states,
Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between
parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and
in accordance with their terms.
STATUTE OF THE COURT, supra note 13, at art. 36, para. 5.
On November 29, 1939, The Republic of Nicaragua sent a telegram to the League of
Nations notifying the Secretary-General that it had ratified the Statute of the Court on Sep-
tember 24, 1929 and that the deposit of the instrument of ratification was to follow. Neverthe-
less, no such deposit ever materialized.
51. Letter from Government of United States to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations (April 24, 1984).
52. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11, at 476.
53. See supra notes 7 and 47.
54. Letter from United States Ambassador to the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions (April 13, 1984) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Letter of April 13, 1984].
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valid or invalid) and the United States Declaration of 26 August
1946 "appear to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court
might be founded. 55 Accordingly, the International Court voted to
grant Nicaragua's request for interim measures of protection.
5
1
C. Prior Case Law
During its entire history, the Permanent Court of International
Justice indicated interim measures of protection only twice - in the
case of the Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 Between
China and Belgium57 and in the case of the Electricity Company of
Sofia and Bulgaria.58 In four other instances, the Permanent Court
refused applicants' request for the indication of provisional mea-
sures.59 Nonetheless, the Permanent Court never found it necessary
to consider what guidelines should be followed when a request for
interim measures of protection is made in cases in which substantive
jurisdiction is contested. The Court therefore never provided any
true guidance on the issue.6 0 In recent years, however, under the aus-
pices of the International Court of Justice, interim measures of pro-
tection are gaining increased favor.
Upon the receipt of its very first request for provisional mea-
55. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11, at 476.
56. By its interim protection order, the Court ruled that the United States should im-
mediately cease and refrain from any action restricting, blocking or endangering access to or
from Nicaraguan ports, and in particular should discontinue the laying of mines. Also, the
United States was warned not to jeopardize the sovereignty or political independence of Nica-
ragua by any military or paramilitary activities in the region. Id. at 477.
57. (China v. BeIg.), 1927 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 8 (Interim Protection Order of Jan. 8)
(question as to whether China could unilaterally denunciate the Treaty between Belgium and
China of Nov. 2, 1865; Belgium requested that provisional measures be indicated to preserve
those rights which might subsequently be recognized as belonging to Belgium or her
nationals).
58. (BeIg. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79 (Interim Protection Order of Dec.
5) (Belgian Government requested that court indicate suspension of any judicial proceedings in
Bulgarian courts until the Permanent Court delivered its judgment on the merits of the
controversy).
59. Polish Agrarian Reform and German Minority (Ger. v. Pol.), 1933 P.C.I.J., ser.
A/B, No. 58 (Interim Protection Order of July 29) (German Government asked court to indi-
cate to the Polish Government that it not expropriate members of the German minority nor
their estates nor establish settlers upon such estates until the Court determined whether cer-
tain treaty violations had occurred); Prince von Pless Administration (Ger. v. Pol.), 1933
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 54 (Interim Protection Order of May 11) (German Government re-
quested Court to indicate to the Polish Government that it should abstain from any measure of
constraint in respect of the property of the Prince von Pless, on account of income tax compli-
cations); Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Nor. v. Den.), 1932
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 48 (Interim Protection Order of Aug. 3) (Norwegian Government re-
quested that Court indicate to the Danish Government that it abstain from any coercive mea-
sures directed against Norwegian nationals in certain territory over which sovereignty was
disputed); Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 12 (Interim Protection
Order of Nov. 21) (Request by German Government that Court indicate to Polish Government
that it immediately pay a certain sum of money due as a result of its expropriation of a
German owned factory).
60. Mendelson, supra note 24, at 268.
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sures,6' the International Court of Justice was forced to determine to
what extent the ICJ was entitled to indicate interim measures of pro-
tection when substantive jurisdiction was contested.62 In the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. case the defendant, Iran, asserted that the petitioner,
the United Kingdom, lacked competence to refer the dispute to the
Court. Iran argued that because the conflict had arisen between the
State of Iran and a private company, the case fell exclusively within
the domestic jurisdiction of Iranian courts. The International Court
of Justice rejected Iran's claims, however, and ruled that because the
complaint in the case did not, a priori, fall completely outside the
scope of international jurisdiction, the Court could entertain the re-
quest for interim measures.63
Unfortunately, the brevity of the Court's order does not provide
a clear guideline by which to evaluate the scope of the Court's inci-
dental jurisdiction. One scholar has stated, however, that the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. case does decide "that the Court is not prevented
from indicating interim measures merely because it has not yet de-
cided on its jurisdiction, and it also decides that objections to the
admissibility of the claim which seem very unlikely to succeed are no
impediment either." 4
Two judges dissented from the majority's decision to grant pro-
visional measures in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case. Writing sepa-
rately, Judges Winiarski and Badawi asserted that the International
Court of Justice should not indicate interim measures unless its com-
petence appears to the Court to be "reasonably probable. 6e5 The dis-
senters clarified this "reasonably probable" test with the following
language: "[I]f there exists weighty arguments in favour of the chal-
lenged jurisdiction, the Court may indicate interim measures of pro-
tection; if there exist serious doubts or weighty arguments against
this jurisdiction, such measures cannot be indicated." '
61. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 89 (Interim Protection Order of
July 5) [hereinafter cited as Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.].
62. Id. at 93.
63. Id. The Court later held by a nine to five vote that it lacked jurisdiction to address
the merits of the case. The Court reasoned that, although Iran and the United Kingdom had
each submitted Declarations of Acceptance to the Court's jurisdiction, the Iranian declaration
excluded all disputes resulting from treaties entered into by Iran prior to its ratification. Be-
cause the Court may adjudicate over matters only when both parties have conferred jurisdic-
tion, the Court declined to take cognizance of the dispute. This was based on a finding that the
treaty in issue preceded the ratification of the Iranian declaration. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
(U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (Judgment of July 22).
64. Mendelson, supra note 13, at 271-72.
65. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., supra note 61, at 97.
66. Id. at 98. Although "weighty arguments" is an ambiguous phrase, the judges' use
of this disjunctive connector seems to imply a connotation different from that of "serious
doubts." Assuming the validity of this argument, it would appear that even when serious
doubts as to the jurisdiction of the Court are absent, other factors may counsel against the
indication of provisional measures. The "weighty arguments" test is discussed further at infra
notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
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Six years later in the Interhandel case, 7 an applicant again pe-
titioned the International Court of Justice to grant a request for pro-
visional measures in a situation which involved contested jurisdiction.
Both the United States and Switzerland, the parties involved in the
proceedings, had made declarations accepting the Court's jurisdic-
tion under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. 8 Nonetheless, as
part of its defense the United States claimed that the dispute fell
outside the Court's jurisdiction because it was governed by the do-
mestic jurisdiction of the United States.69 The United States argued
that once it determined that the matter was one of domestic jurisdic-
tion, the International Court of Justice was precluded from making a
judgment as to the extent of the Court's own jurisdiction.70
A change in the circumstances of the Interhandel dispute led
the Court to believe that a final determination on the jurisdiction
issues was unnecessary. 71 However, despite the fact that the Court
never conclusively decided the issue, the majority did set forth its
position regarding one guideline that should be followed in future
determinations. The Court stated that merely raising an objection to
its jurisdiction would not by itself be enough to prevent the indica-
tion of interim measures. That is, an inquiry about the Court's com-
petence does not, ipso facto, preclude the indication of provisional
measures.
72
In a separate opinion to the Interhandel case, Judge Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht concluded that the Court should not indicate interim
measures. Lauterpacht stated that governments that are party to the
Statute of the Court have a right to expect that the Court will not
act under Article 41 in cases "in which absence of jurisdiction on the
merits is manifest. ' 73 Yet, Lauterpacht did not imply that jurisdic-
tion is automatically inferred when no manifestation to the contrary
is present. He went on to state that,
[t]he Court may properly act under the terms of Article 41 pro-
vided that there is in existence an instrument such as a Declara-
tion of Acceptance of the Optional Clause, emanating from the
parties to the dispute, which prima facie confers jurisdiction
67. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1957 I.C.J. 105 (Interim Protection Order of Oct. 24)
[hereinafter cited as Interhandel].
68. Swiss Declaration of Acceptance to the Jurisdiction of the International Court, re-
printed in 1979-1980 I.C.J.Y.B. 80 (1980); U.S. Declaration of Acceptance, supra note 36.
69. See U.S. Declaration of Acceptance, supra note 36, at para. (b).
70. Interhandel, supra note 67, at 107.
71. As basis for its request for provisional measures, Switzerland contended that cer-
tain shares of stock were in danger of being sold before the final court decision. Because the
United States Government had not fixed a time schedule for the sale of the stock and was in
fact prevented from such sale until it obtained a favorable verdict in a pending American
judicial proceeding, the Court found no danger to exist. Id. at 112.
72. Mendelson, supra note 24, at 275. See Interhandel, supra note 67, at I11.
73. Interhandel, supra note 67, at 118.
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upon the Court and which incorporates no reservations obviously
excluding its jurisdiction."'
In other words, for a valid assertion of jurisdiction to be made, the
absence of any reservations that could be regarded as expressly ex-
cluding jurisdiction must be buttressed by something positive on
which jurisdiction of the Court may be based. Lauterpacht suggests
that some type of instrument of express consent, such as a treaty or
agreement is necessary to accomplish this.
More than fifteen years later the perplexing issue of incidental
jurisdiction again surfaced before the International Court of Justice.
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction (Interim Measures) cases, 75 both the
majority opinion and a lone dissenter relied on tests that members of
the Court had set forth previously in Anglo-Iranian. Oil Co.76 and
Interhandel.77 The controversy at issue arose over a proposed exten-
sion of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction around the State of Iceland.
The Applicants, Great Britain and West Germany, contended that a
special agreement 78 between the parties to the proceedings conferred
jurisdiction upon the Court. 79 Respondent Iceland protested that the
agreement invoked by the Applicants had terminated prior to the
institution of the proceedings and therefore did not operate to bestow
substantive jurisdiction on the International Court.
By a fourteen to one vote, the Court decided to grant Appli-
cants' request for provisional measures. The majority opinion reiter-
ated the principle, which was by then fairly well settled, that the
Court need not absolutely satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction over
the merits of the case before indicating interim measures of protec-
tion. The Court did, however, limit this broad statement by applying
the Lauterpacht test elucidated in Interhandel°: "[The Court] ought
not to act under Article 41 of the Statute if the absence of jurisdic-
74. Id.
75. (Ger. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 30 (Interim Protection Order of Aug. 17); (U.K. v. Ice.),
1972 I.C.J. 12 (Interim Protection Order of Aug. 17). For purposes of this comment, the facts
and rulings of these two cases are the same.
76. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
78. This special agreement was set forth in the Exchange of Notes (March 11, 1961).
It stated,
The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the implementation of
the Altering Resolution of May 5, 1959, regarding the extension of fisheries ju-
risdiction around Iceland, but shall give to the [Applicants] six months notice of
such extension, and, in case of a dispute in relation to such extensions, the
matter shall, at the request of either party, be referred to the International
Court of Justice.
Quoted in Mendelson, supra note 24, at 279 (emphasis added).
79. Article 36(1) of the Statute of the Court states, "the jurisdiction of the Court com-
prises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided in the charter of
the United Nations or in treaties or conventions in force." STATUTE OF THE COURT, supra note
13, at art. 36, para. 1.
80. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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tion is manifest." 81
The Court therefore concluded in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
cases that the applicable provision in the agreement between the par-
ties82 appeared, prima facie, to afford a possible basis on which the
jurisdiction of the Court might be found. This was sufficient to war-
rant an indication of provisional measures. Thus, from this opinion it
appears that as long as the possibility of substantive jurisdiction has
not been completely ruled out, the ICJ's incidental jurisdiction
attaches.
Only one member of the Court dissented from the conclusions
of the majority. Judge Padilla Nervo voted against the indication of
interim measures after concluding that "serious doubts or weighty
arguments" against the Court's jurisdiction were present.8 3 This was
of course, the very same test endorsed by Judges Winiarski and
Badawi in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case.84
The Court modified the incidental jurisdiction test it had set
forth in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases barely one year later in the
Nuclear Tests cases.8 5 The controversy in these cases concerned the
legality of certain atmospheric nuclear weapons tests then being con-
ducted by France in the South Pacific. The factual arguments con-
cerning the Court's substantive jurisdiction were strikingly similar to
the arguments in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases. The Applicants,
New Zealand and Australia, asserted that jurisdiction vested in the
International Court of Justice by means of a special agreement
wherein the parties had agreed to settle their disputes by submitting
them to the Court.8" Furthermore, New Zealand and Australia con-
tended that the parties were bound by their declarations of accept-
ance to the Court's jurisdiction. 87 In its defense, France protested
that the agreement in question was no longer in effect.88 In response
to the Applicants' second argument, France countered that the
French declaration excluded from the ICJ's jurisdiction any disputes
relating to national defense.
8 9
Unlike the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the Court decided that it
81. (U.K. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12, 15-16 (Interim Protection Order of Aug. 17). Thus,
although the Lauterpacht test had been mere dicta after the Interhandel case, the Fisheries
Jurisdiction cases elevated its status to that of a bona fide rule of law.
82. See supra note 78.
83. (U.K. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12, 22; (Ger. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 30, 39.
84. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
85. (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 1.C.J. 99 (Interim Protection Order of June 22); (N.Z. v. Fr.),
1973 I.C.J. 135 (Interim Protection Order of June 22).
86. General Act for the Settlement of Pacific Disputes, opened for signature Sept. 26,
1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 343. Australia, New Zealand and France are all parties to the Act.
87. Memorial of Australia (Austl. v. Fr.), 1978 I.C.J. Pleadings (1 Nuclear Test) 305-
15; Memorial of New Zealand (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1978 I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Nuclear Test) 187-98.
88. (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 102; (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 138.
89. (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 102; (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 138.
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should not exercise any power it might have had under the agree-
ment between the parties in the Nuclear Test cases until it reached
the stage of the proceedings when it would become necessary to de-
cide whether the agreement was still in force.90 The Court would not
examine any power conferred upon it by express agreement of the
parties because to do so would require an examination of the merits
of the case. Specifically, the Court stated: "[T]he Court is not in a
position to reach a final conclusion on this point at the present stage
of the proceedings, and will therefore examine the request for the
indication of interim measures only in the context of Article 41 of
the Statute". 91 The Court then proceeded to determine the extent of
its Article 41 power by applying a test similar to that utilized by the
majority in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case. 92 The Court restated
that doctrine in the following language:
Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court
need not, before indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it has
jurisdiction on the merits of the case, and yet ought not to indi-
cate such measures unless the provisions invoked by the Appli-
cant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdic-
tion of the Court might be founded.93
The Court ultimately voted eight to six in favor of indicating
interim measures of protection.94 Judge Forester dissented, stating
his belief that the Court should have examined the question of sub-
stantive jurisdiction more thoroughly before finding in favor of its
own incidental jurisdiction. In particular, Forester believed that the
majority should have scrutinized the validity of the special agree-
ment more carefully. 95
It appears that Judge Forester preferred a "weighty arguments"
type of test. The alleged facts of the case seemed to make clear that
the absence of the Court's jurisdiction was not "manifest." Nonethe-
less Forester believed that the Court should have employed a stricter
90. Presumably, the Court was referring to that stage of the proceedings in which it
would conclusively decide the question of substantive jurisdiction.
91. (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 103; (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 139. See also
supra text accompanying note 21. The Court decided that it was not necessary to estimate the
probability of its substantive jurisdiction. Instead, the Court looked only to whether a prima
facie possibility of incidental jurisdiction existed.
92. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
93. (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 101; (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 137.
94. The decision of the Court was made without any final ruling on the issue of sub-
stantive jurisdiction. The year following the Court's Interim Protection Order, France publicly
declared that it would change from atmospheric testing to underground testing. The Court
decided that because this declaration constituted a legal undertaking by France to make the
change, any consideration of the jurisdiction issue had been rendered moot. Nuclear Test cases
(Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C. 253 (Judgment of Dec. 20); (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Judg-
ment of Dec. 20).
95. (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 112. See also (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 178.
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test, i.e., a test that provided for more careful consideration of the
purported basis for substantive jurisdiction. Judge Forester would
have been more pleased had the Court been less liberal in finding
incidental jurisdiction because where the issues in dispute appeared,
prima facie, to fall within the Court's jurisdiction, weighty argu-
ments against the Court's competence may nevertheless have
existed.
96
Later in 1973, in the Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War,9 the
International Court of Justice was forced to consider another request
for provisional measures in the face of a disagreement between Paki-
stan and India as to the Court's competence. Deliberations were not
lengthy because before the Court could decide the question of inci-
dental jurisdiction a change in the relationship between the parties
led the Court to believe that the urgency of the request had substan-
tially decreased.98 As a result, the Court removed the case from its
docket without benefit of an opinion concerning interim measures. 99
The next case to deal with the Article 41 powers of the Court
was Aegean Sea Continental Shelf.'00 The dispute in the case con-
cerned certain activities of Turkey that were alleged to infringe the
sovereign and exclusive rights of Greece to explore and exploit its
own continental shelf. Despite Greece's arguments to the contrary,
the Court ruled that the circumstances of the case did not warrant
an exercise of the Court's power to indicate interim measures. The
Court reasoned that the alleged facts failed to demonstrate a sub-
stantial risk of irreparable damage to the rights in issue. The Court
therefore denied the Applicant's request for provisional measures.1
The court ruled in addition that a denial of a request for provisional
measures precluded a decision regarding incidental jurisdiction. The
Court thus narrowed the application of its test for incidental juris-
diction by ruling that the test would be utilized only when absolutely
necessary to the resolution of a claim.
Six years later, on November 4, 1979, the United States com-
pound in Tehran, Iran was overrun by a heavily armed group of sev-
eral hundred hostile people who seized as hostages all diplomatic and
96. See supra note 95.
97. (Pak. v. India), 1973 I.C.J. 328 (Interim Protection Order of July 13) [hereinafter
cited as Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War].
98. The dispute in this case primarily concerned the status of Pakistani nationals who
had been accused of committing acts of genocide in Pakistani territory. The request for interim
measures sought to prevent India from trying the prisoners before the final outcome of the
proceedings before the International Court. Prior to a finalized decision on the request, Paki-
stan petitioned the Court to postpone its rulings in order to facilitate negotiations between the
parties. Id.
99. Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), 1973 I.C.J. 347 (Order of Dec.
15).
100. (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 2 (Interim Protection Order of Sept. 11).
101. Id. at 40.
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consular personnel present on the premises. Despite repeated efforts
to obtain assistance from the authorities, the Iranian Government
failed to dispatch its security forces in time to protect the Embassy.
The next morning, November 5, 1979, additional groups seized
United States consulates in Tabiz and Shiraz. The Iranian Govern-
ment again failed to take protective action.'0 2
On November 29, 1979, a representative of the United States
Department of State filed Application with the Registrar of Court of
the International Court to institute legal proceedings against the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran.10 3 On the same day, the United States filed a
request for the indication of provisional measures. 10 4 This request de-
manded that the Iranian Government immediately release all Ameri-
can hostages and restore the United States Embassy, Chancery, and
Consulate in Tehran to American control.
On December 9, 1979, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran
transmitted a letter to the International Court that contested the
Court's competence to adjudicate the dispute." 5 This letter stated
Iran's belief that the Court could not and should not take cognizance
of the dispute because,
this question only represents a marginal and secondary as-
pect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied
separately . . . the Court cannot examine the American Appli-
cation divorced from its proper context, namely the whole politi-
cal dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States
over the past twenty-five years.1
06
The Iranian letter also claimed that to grant the American request
for interim measures would be to pass judgment in favor of the
United States. 10 7 In essence, although Iran did not formally contest
the validity of those treaties and conventions invoked by the United
States to confer jurisdiction on the Court, by arguing the historical
political circumstances surrounding the dispute, Iran did in fact set
forth a "weighty argument" against the Court's competence. 0 8
The International Court rejected the Iranian contention that it
would not entertain the United States' request and instead unani-
mously voted to indicate provisional measures."' The Court opined
102. See generally United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24).
103. Memorial of United States (U.S. v. Iran), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings (U.S. Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran) 3-8.
104. Id. at 11-12.
105. Id. at 18-19.
106. The full text of the letter is reproduced in United States v. Iran (Interim Protec-
tion), supra note 19, at 7-10.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 66.
109. Id.
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that a dispute concerning diplomatic and consular premises and the
detention of internationally protected persons by its very nature falls
within international jurisdiction. Thus, the Court ruled that the case
at issue met its test for incidental jurisdiction. That test, as articu-
lated by the Court, required that provisional measures be indicated
"only if the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie,
to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded." 110 This test substantially conforms with the "prima facie
possibility" test previously endorsed by the Court in Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co., Fisheries Jurisdiction and Nuclear Tests cases.
D. Analysis of the Legal Tests Developed through Case Law
A review of the case law of the International Court of Justice
reveals that the Court has employed three basic tests to evaluate the
extent of its Article 41 powers to indicate provisional measures. For
the sake of clarity, they are discussed in order of their relative diffi-
culty of satisfaction rather than in order of their importance or fre-
quency of use by the Court.
The first test is the easiest of the three to satisfy. It requires
that an applicant's complaint before the Court fall within the scope
of international justice."1 While this is of course an important crite-
rion, it does not by itself clearly define the standard upon which the
Court may evaluate its incidental jurisdiction. Presumably, nearly
any issue raised by an applicant that does not clearly fall outside the
realm of international law would meet this test.
112
The second test that the Court has utilized in its deliberations
on the issue of its jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures is
termed the "prima facie possibility" test."' The Court has most
commonly expressed this test in two ways: first, the Court may indi-
cate interim measures when "the absence of jurisdiction is not mani-
fest,"14 i.e., the so-called Lauterpacht test. 5 The second way in
which the Court has set forth this test is by stating that jurisdic-
tional grounds invoked by a party must demonstrate a "prima facie
appearance of a possible basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court
might be founded." ' 6 These two formulas articulate one standard.
The former merely states the test in the negative, whereas the latter
takes a positive approach. Consolidated, these two formulas stand for
I10. Id. at 13.
11I. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., supra note 61, at 93.
112: An example of an issue that would clearly fall outside the realm of international
law is an issue that unequivocally falls within a State's domestic jurisdiction.
113. See, e.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. supra note 61; cases cited supra notes 75, 85.
114. See Interhandel, supra note 67, at 118.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 106 and text accompanying note 110.
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the proposition that when an applicant shows a prima facie appear-
ance of a possible basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might
be founded, the absence of jurisdiction is not manifest.
The prima facie possibility test has never been precisely ex-
plained by the International Court despite the fact that of the three
tests it is used most frequently. 1 7 Nonetheless, a fair reading of the
cases. applying the prima facie test suggests that unless the Court's
lack of jurisdiction is obvious, the Court will deem itself to have inci-
dental jurisdiction.
The requirements set forth under the third test in the set are the
most ambiguous, perhaps due to the fact that this test has not gained
much favor with the Court and indeed has never been endorsed by a
majority opinion. This "weighty arguments" test was first articulated
by Judges Winiarski and Badawi in their separate opinion in the An-
glo-Iranian Oil Co. case. 1 8 There are two possible interpretations of
this method of evaluation. First, the weighty arguments test can be
viewed as nothing more than a balancing technique, i.e., a weighing
of the pros and cons of jurisdictional arguments in a given case. Of
course this implies that in cases when the balance tilts ever so
slightly toward the "con," the Court would not be able to indicate
interim measures. Given the past history of the Court's decisions on
this issue, " 9 it is highly unlikely that this interpretation would ever
gain any real measure of popularity with the international judiciary.
A second interpretation of the weighty arguments test is that it
is merely a policy based test. In other words, the weighty arguments
necessary to meet this test may be nothing more than extra-judicial
considerations either in favor or against the Court's taking jurisdic-
tion. This interpretation is more likely to become a factor in the
Court's decisions given that in two recent cases, including Nicaragua
v. United States,20 defendants have attempted to sway the Court's
decision by advancing these policy arguments.
III. The ICJ's Application of the Legal Tests to Nicaragua v.
United States
In ruling on the Nicaraguan request for interim protective mea-
sures in Nicaragua v. United States, the Court utilized the prima
facie possibility test. In doing so the Court ruled that Nicaragua had
met the requirements of that test and was therefore entitled to the
interim measures of protection. Specifically, the Court stated:
117. See notes 73-94, 110 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 65-66.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66, 83-84, 95-96.
120. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11, at 475 and 476. See also U.S. v. Iran
(Interim Protection), supra note 19, at 7-10.
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Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court
need not, before deciding whether or not to indicate them, fi-
nally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the
case, or, as the case may be, that an objection taken to jurisdic-
tion is well-founded, yet it ought not to indicate such measures
unless the provisions invoked by Applicant appear, prima facie,
to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
founded. 21
This ruling by the Court, although resolving one assertion made by
the United States in protesting the exercise of the Court's jurisdic-
tion, did not conclusively determine all the bases upon which the
United States challenged that jurisdiction.
The United States further attempted to prevent the Court from
indicating provisional measures by advancing certain policy argu-
ments against an international adjudication of the dispute. The
United States argued that the issues raised in the dispute comprised:
but one facet of a complex of interrelated political, social, eco-
nomic and security matters that confront the Central American
region. These matters are the subject of regional diplomatic ef-
forts known as the "Contadora Process." . . . The concern of
the United States is that bilateral judicial proceedings initiated
by Nicaragua would impede this ongoing multilateral diplomatic
process.122
Clearly, the United States attempted to advance two extra-judi-
cial policy arguments. First, the United States asserted that the situ-
ation at issue was a political, sociological and economic problem that
could not be solved through legal proceedings. Second, on-going ne-
gotiations between the parties would make legal proceedings particu-
larly inappropriate.
In at least one previous case, United States v. Iran,123 the Re-
spondent likewise contended that regardless of the Court's jurisdic-
tion over the dispute, political policy arguments counseled against
the admissibility of Petitioner's claim. In United States v. Iran Re-
spondent Iran asserted that the true issues involved in the case could
be resolved only through political channels, rather than by legal pro-
ceedings. The International Court rejected Iran's policy arguments
and stated that, despite the political context in which the dispute
arose, "the detention of internationally protected persons as hostages
cannot, in the view of the Court, be regarded as something 'second-
ary' or 'marginal' having regard to the importance of the legal prin-
121. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11, at 473.
122. U.S. Letter of April 13, 1984, supra note 54.
123. United States v. Iran (Interim Protection), supra note 19.
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ciples involved."' 24
The Court addressed the policy arguments submitted by Iran
not as "weighty arguments" but rather as a defense to the question
of the "international scope" of the claim. 2 5 As evidence of this, the
Court reasoned that because the situation in Tehran posed a serious
threat to international peace and security, its resolution might natu-
rally involve the International Court. 26 The Court did not consider
what positive effects, if any, its adjudication over the claim might
have insofar as easing the tension between the parties or assuring the
safety of the American hostages were concerned. The Court merely
noted that no provision of the Statute or Rules contemplated that the
Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute
merely because that dispute had other aspects.
127
As defendant in Nicaragua v. United States, the representative
of the United States argued that the questions raised in the dispute
should be more properly committed to resolution by the political or-
gans of the United Nations and the Organization of American
States (OAS). 2 8 The United States pointed out that, while all situa-
tions involving the threat or use of force:
necessarily involve Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter or other issues of law or legally signifi-
cant facts, . . . that does not mean that this Court can, or
should, take cognizance of the legal aspects of those situations in
the midst of ongoing hostilities, and while the political processes
of the United Nations and the OAS are still engaged.' 29
In response to this argument, the International Court cited its
own case law on the political question issue. The Court pointed out
that in previous decisions, it had established the rule that the Court
is not required to decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dis-
pute merely because that dispute has other aspects.' 30 Additionally,
the Court stated that it should not reject an essentially judicial task
merely because the issues before the Court are intertwined with po-
litical questions.' 3 '
Despite this reliance by the International Court on previous case
law, the Nicaragua v. United States case differs in two significant
respects from any other politically oriented case to come before the
World Court. First, Nicaragua's lawsuit represents the first instance
124. Id. at 15.
125. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
126. United States v. Iran (Interim Protection), supra note 19, at 15.
127. Id.
128. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11, at 476.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Iran (Interim Protection), supra note 19, at 15.
131. Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 11, at 476.
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in which the International Court has been called upon to resolve
what is essentially a continuing armed conflict. Second, the fact that
Nicaragua and the United States were involved in diplomatic negoti-
ations at the time Nicaragua initiated proceedings also distinguishes
this case from earlier cases in which the Court voted to indicate pro-
visional measures. In United States v. Iran, for example, diplomatic
relations between the two parties had been completely suspended as
a result of the hostage crisis. The facts of that case revealed little
chance of peaceful reconciliation at the time legal proceedings were
brought before the International Court.132 In contrast, in Nicaragua
v. United States, the United States repeatedly argued that the Cen-
tral American conflict could be better resolved by means of a diplo-
matic approach. The Contadora Peace Process presented such an
alternative. 133
The Contadora Group'" lists among its objectives: a program of
verifiable arms reductions by Central American countries, the pa-
trolling of borders to stop the flow of guerillas and arms and the
withdrawal of foreign advisors from the region. The Group's goal is
to embody its objectives in treaties between antagonistic nations in
the region and between the United States and Nicaragua. 13 The ba-
sic terms of the proposed United States-Nicaraguan treaty would re-
quire the United States to remove its troops and advisors from Hon-
duras and El Salvador in exchange for a cessation of Nicaraguan
support for Salvadoran insurgents and the removal of Cuban and
other advisors from Nicaragua.1 The United States has publicly
spoken in favor of the process and the Nicaraguan head of State
participated in the signing of a joint declaration giving full support
to Contadora. 37
However, despite these moves toward a peaceful resolution of
United States-Nicaraguan differences, it is possible that the Interna-
tional Court's May 1984 order of injunctive relief has had the detri-
mental effect on the negotiations that the United States representa-
tive asserted it would have in his argument to the Court. On January
18, 1985, White House officials announced that the United States
had suspended negotiations with the government in Managua.1 38
One senior Reagan official stated that talks with the Sandinistas
were largely unproductive due to the fact the ICJ's indicia of interim
relief gave Nicaragua no incentive to make concessions. The official
132. See generally United States v. Iran (Interim Protection), supra note 19.
133. See supra note 7.
134. See supra notes 7 and 47 and accompanying text.
135. See generally 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 836-863 (1984).
136. Id.
137. Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 6, 1984 at 2, col. 1.
138. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
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said that the Reagan Administration planned to appeal to Congress
to resume aid to Nicaragua rebels to provide the kind of leverage the
White House believed to be lacking.' 3 9
A quick study reveals that the interim measures indicated by
the International Court'40 have had no true positive effect on the
troubled situation in Central America.' 4' This is largely due to
American non-compliance which has been prompted by the fact that
the United States, like all nations, will act in its own political best
interests even in defiance of international law.
On January 18, 1985, the very same day the United States sus-
pended negotiations with Managua, the United States formally with-
drew from the proceedings initiated by Nicaragua in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. 142 The United States asserted that the
proceedings constituted a misuse of the Court for political purposes
and that the conflict in Central America could only be resolved by
political and diplomatic means rather than through a judicial tribu-
nal.' 43 Given the connection between the United States withdrawal
from the proceedings in the World Court and the simultaneous dis-
continuance of negotiations with Nicaragua, it is clear that although
the United States seeks to end the turmoil in Central America, it
will attempt to do so acting in accordance with political norms
rather than in compliance with international law as that law is ar-
ticulated by the International Court.
IV. Conclusion
The International Court of Justice is the final authority on the
issue of its own jurisdiction. A study of the Court's own precedents
indicates that under the principles established in those cases, the
Court was clearly seized of the requisite incidental jurisdiction nec-
essary to indicate interim measures in the case of Nicaragua v.
United States. Nevertheless, given the political ramifications of the
controversy the Court might have chosen to pursue an alternative
other than that of ordering injunctive relief in a situation in which
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In the Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War, the Court declined
to reach a decision on the request for interim measures for inher-
ently political reasons. Based on the mere likelihood that the parties
to the controversy would begin diplomatic negotiations, the Court
removed the case from its docket. Given the same, if not greater,
likelihood of negotiations between the contestants in Nicaragua v.
United States, the International Court might have refused the re-
quest for injunctive relief or at least delayed its decision.
The Court's decision to grant Nicaragua's request for provi-
sional measures is especially open to criticism given the fact that in
some important respects the case is one of first impression.145 Be-
cause the United States claimed that its actions were motivated by
the political doctrine of collective security and of self defense against
aggression, the role of the International Court in the dispute has
raised substantial controversy."" Indeed, for the first time, the Court
has been accused of departing from its tradition of judicial restraint
and of venturing into "treacherous political waters. 11 7 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice cannot risk becoming stigmatized as a politi-
cal institution, or its credibility as a respected international authority
will suffer.
Party compliance poses an additional difficulty in cases in which
the International Court chooses to grant injunctive relief. In the
Fisheries Jurisdiction cases as well as in United States v. Iran re-
spondents ignored the Court's suggestion of provisional measures. By
its formal withdrawal from World Court proceedings, the United
States clearly implied that it will also defy the Court's indication
that the United States cease covert military activities in Nicaragua.
Because the International Court has no practical means of enforcing
its own rulings, it must rely on a certain amount of self-policing by
individual States. Keeping in mind the inherent political nature of
those States, and the fact that they act in their political best inter-
ests, the Court would do well to exercise greater judicial restraint
when deciding whether to take cognizance of politically oriented
disputes.
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